Ownership, Competition, and Corruption : Bribe Takers versus Bribe Payers

Ownership, Competition, and Corruption : Bribe Takers versus Bribe Payers

Over the past few years, many studies have looked at the macroeconomic, cultural, and institutional determinants of corruption. This study complements these cross-country studies by focusing on microeconomic factors that affect bribes paid in a sin...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Clarke, George R. G., Xu, Lixin Colin
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2013
Subjects:
ACCOUNTABILITY
BALANCE SHEET
BENCHMARKS
CIVIL SERVICE
COLLUSION
COMPETITION POLICY
CONSOLIDATION
CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
DECENTRALIZATION
ECONOMIC OUTCOMES
ENTERPRISE OWNERSHIP
EXCESS DEMAND
EXPORTS
FINANCIAL SECTOR
FOREIGN COMPETITION
GDP
HUMAN CAPITAL
INCOME
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
INCOME LEVELS
INFLATION
MARGINAL COST
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION
MONOPOLY RENTS
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
PENALTIES
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
PRIVATIZATION
PROFITABILITY
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
PUBLIC SERVICES
PUBLIC UTILITIES
RENT SEEKING
RISK PREMIUM
TAXATION
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
UNEMPLOYMENT
URBANIZATION
UTILITIES
VOTERS
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/02/1703258/ownership-competition-corruption-bribe-takers-versus-bribe-payers
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15635

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/02/1703258/ownership-competition-corruption-bribe-takers-versus-bribe-payers
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15635

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