Ownership, Competition, and Corruption : Bribe Takers versus Bribe Payers
Over the past few years, many studies have looked at the macroeconomic, cultural, and institutional determinants of corruption. This study complements these cross-country studies by focusing on microeconomic factors that affect bribes paid in a sin...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/02/1703258/ownership-competition-corruption-bribe-takers-versus-bribe-payers http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15635 |
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okr-10986-156352021-04-23T14:03:19Z Ownership, Competition, and Corruption : Bribe Takers versus Bribe Payers Clarke, George R. G. Xu, Lixin Colin ACCOUNTABILITY BALANCE SHEET BENCHMARKS CIVIL SERVICE COLLUSION COMPETITION POLICY CONSOLIDATION CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS DECENTRALIZATION ECONOMIC OUTCOMES ENTERPRISE OWNERSHIP EXCESS DEMAND EXPORTS FINANCIAL SECTOR FOREIGN COMPETITION GDP HUMAN CAPITAL INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INFLATION MARGINAL COST MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION MONOPOLY RENTS NASH EQUILIBRIUM PENALTIES PRICE DISCRIMINATION PRIVATIZATION PROFITABILITY PUBLIC ENTERPRISES PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC UTILITIES RENT SEEKING RISK PREMIUM TAXATION TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRANSITION ECONOMIES UNEMPLOYMENT URBANIZATION UTILITIES VOTERS Over the past few years, many studies have looked at the macroeconomic, cultural, and institutional determinants of corruption. This study complements these cross-country studies by focusing on microeconomic factors that affect bribes paid in a single sector of the economy. Using enterprise-level data on bribes paid to utilities in 21 transition economies in Easter Europe and Central Asia, the authors look at how characteristics of the firms paying bribes (such as ownership, profitability, and size) and characteristics of the utilities taking bribes (such as competition and utility capacity) affect the equilibrium level of corruption in the sector. On the side of bribe payers, enterprises that are more profitable, enterprises that have greater overdue payment to utilities, and de novo private firms pay higher bribes. On the side of bribe takers, bribes paid to utilities are higher in countries with greater constraints on utility capacity, lower levels of competition in the utility sector, and where utilities are state-owned. Bribes in the utility sector are also correlated with many of the macroeconomic and political factors that previous studies have found to affect the overall level of corruption. 2013-09-04T22:06:49Z 2013-09-04T22:06:49Z 2002-02 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/02/1703258/ownership-competition-corruption-bribe-takers-versus-bribe-payers http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15635 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2783 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Central Asia Eastern Europe |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY BALANCE SHEET BENCHMARKS CIVIL SERVICE COLLUSION COMPETITION POLICY CONSOLIDATION CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS DECENTRALIZATION ECONOMIC OUTCOMES ENTERPRISE OWNERSHIP EXCESS DEMAND EXPORTS FINANCIAL SECTOR FOREIGN COMPETITION GDP HUMAN CAPITAL INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INFLATION MARGINAL COST MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION MONOPOLY RENTS NASH EQUILIBRIUM PENALTIES PRICE DISCRIMINATION PRIVATIZATION PROFITABILITY PUBLIC ENTERPRISES PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC UTILITIES RENT SEEKING RISK PREMIUM TAXATION TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRANSITION ECONOMIES UNEMPLOYMENT URBANIZATION UTILITIES VOTERS |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY BALANCE SHEET BENCHMARKS CIVIL SERVICE COLLUSION COMPETITION POLICY CONSOLIDATION CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS DECENTRALIZATION ECONOMIC OUTCOMES ENTERPRISE OWNERSHIP EXCESS DEMAND EXPORTS FINANCIAL SECTOR FOREIGN COMPETITION GDP HUMAN CAPITAL INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INFLATION MARGINAL COST MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION MONOPOLY RENTS NASH EQUILIBRIUM PENALTIES PRICE DISCRIMINATION PRIVATIZATION PROFITABILITY PUBLIC ENTERPRISES PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC UTILITIES RENT SEEKING RISK PREMIUM TAXATION TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRANSITION ECONOMIES UNEMPLOYMENT URBANIZATION UTILITIES VOTERS Clarke, George R. G. Xu, Lixin Colin Ownership, Competition, and Corruption : Bribe Takers versus Bribe Payers |
| geographic_facet |
Central Asia Eastern Europe |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2783 |
| description |
Over the past few years, many studies
have looked at the macroeconomic, cultural, and
institutional determinants of corruption. This study
complements these cross-country studies by focusing on
microeconomic factors that affect bribes paid in a single
sector of the economy. Using enterprise-level data on bribes
paid to utilities in 21 transition economies in Easter
Europe and Central Asia, the authors look at how
characteristics of the firms paying bribes (such as
ownership, profitability, and size) and characteristics of
the utilities taking bribes (such as competition and utility
capacity) affect the equilibrium level of corruption in the
sector. On the side of bribe payers, enterprises that are
more profitable, enterprises that have greater overdue
payment to utilities, and de novo private firms pay higher
bribes. On the side of bribe takers, bribes paid to
utilities are higher in countries with greater constraints
on utility capacity, lower levels of competition in the
utility sector, and where utilities are state-owned. Bribes
in the utility sector are also correlated with many of the
macroeconomic and political factors that previous studies
have found to affect the overall level of corruption. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Clarke, George R. G. Xu, Lixin Colin |
| author_facet |
Clarke, George R. G. Xu, Lixin Colin |
| author_sort |
Clarke, George R. G. |
| title |
Ownership, Competition, and Corruption : Bribe Takers versus Bribe Payers |
| title_short |
Ownership, Competition, and Corruption : Bribe Takers versus Bribe Payers |
| title_full |
Ownership, Competition, and Corruption : Bribe Takers versus Bribe Payers |
| title_fullStr |
Ownership, Competition, and Corruption : Bribe Takers versus Bribe Payers |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Ownership, Competition, and Corruption : Bribe Takers versus Bribe Payers |
| title_sort |
ownership, competition, and corruption : bribe takers versus bribe payers |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/02/1703258/ownership-competition-corruption-bribe-takers-versus-bribe-payers http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15635 |
| _version_ |
1764429733568708608 |