Cooperation and Reciprocity in Carbon Sequestration Contracts

Cooperation and Reciprocity in Carbon Sequestration Contracts

This paper studies the role of cooperation and reciprocity on the structure of self-enforcing carbon sequestration contracts. The optimal contract is derived as a result of the optimizing actions of purely self-interested agents, and agents that ac...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Cordero Salas, Paula
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2013
Subjects:
AFFORESTATION
AMOUNT OF CREDITS
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
BIODIVERSITY
BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION
BIOMASS
BIOMASS CARBON
BREACH
BREACHES
BUYER
BUYERS
CARBON
CARBON CREDITS
CARBON DIOXIDE
CARBON EMISSION
CARBON EMISSIONS
CARBON EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION
CARBON LEVEL
CARBON MARKET
CARBON OFFSETS
CARBON SEQUESTRATION
CARBON SINK
CARBON SINKS
CARBON STOCK
CARBON STOCKS
CARBON STORAGE
CLIMATE
CLIMATE CHANGE
CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION
COMPENSATION
CONSERVATION OF CARBON
CONTRACT DESIGN
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS
CONTRACT OFFERS
COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM
DESIGNING CONTRACTS
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPING COUNTRY
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
EMAIL ADDRESS
EMISSIONS
EMISSIONS ABATEMENT
EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION
ENFORCEABILITY
ENFORCEMENT CONSTRAINTS
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
EQUILIBRIUM
FINANCIAL SUPPORT
FIXED COSTS
FOREST
FOREST CARBON
FOREST CLEARING
FOREST CONSERVATION
FOREST COVER
FOREST DEGRADATION
FOREST LAND
FOREST LANDS
FOREST PROTECTION
FORESTRY
FORESTS
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
GOOD FAITH
GREENHOUSE
GREENHOUSE GAS
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
HIDDEN INFORMATION
HOLDING
INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY CONSTRAINT
INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY CONSTRAINTS
INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS
INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY CONSTRAINT
INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY CONSTRAINTS
INTERNATIONAL BANK
LABOR MARKETS
LAND HOLDER
LAND HOLDERS
LAND RIGHTS
LAND USE
LAND USES
LEGALLY BINDING OBLIGATION
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
LONG-TERM AGREEMENT
MARKET OPPORTUNITY
MATERIAL
MONETARY PAYOFF
MONETARY PAYOFFS
OPEN ACCESS
OPPORTUNITY COST
OPTIMAL CONTRACT
OPTIMAL CONTRACTS
PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINT
PARTNERSHIP
PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
POLITICAL ECONOMY
PROOF OF PROPOSITION
RELATIONAL CONTRACT
RELATIONAL CONTRACTS
REMEDIES
REMUNERATION
RENEGOTIATION
RESULT
RESULTS
RETURN
RETURNS
RISK-NEUTRAL
SAFETY NETS
SELLER
SELLERS
TECHNICAL ISSUES
THIRD PARTY
TRADING
TRUST FUND
UNDER CONTRACT
USES
VALUATION
WEB
other-regarding preferences
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17940860/cooperation-reciprocity-carbon-sequestration-contracts
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15880

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17940860/cooperation-reciprocity-carbon-sequestration-contracts
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15880

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