Do Infrastructure Reforms Reduce the Effect of Corruption? Theory and Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean

This paper investigates the interaction between corruption and governance at the sector level. A simple model illustrates how both an increase in regulatory autonomy and privatization may influence the effect of corruption. The interaction is analy...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Wren-Lewis, Liam
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, D.C. 2013
Subjects:	ACCOUNTABILITY ANTI-CORRUPTION AUDITING AUDITS AUTONOMY BANK DEPOSITS BENCHMARKING BEST PRACTICES BRIBE BRIBERY BUSINESS CLIMATE CAPACITY BUILDING CITIZENS CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS CONFIDENCE CONSUMERS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPT CORRUPT POLITICIANS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION COSTS CORRUPTION LEVELS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS COUNTRY DATA CRISES DECISION-MAKING DEMOCRACY DEPOSITS DEREGULATION DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISCRETION DIVISION OF POWERS ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMICS EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT ELASTICITY EMPLOYMENT ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES ENTERPRISE REFORM ENTERPRISE SURVEYS EXPORTS FINANCIAL SECTOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FUTURE RESEARCH GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOVERNANCE COMPONENT GOVERNANCE COMPONENTS GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT REGULATION GOVERNMENT SPENDING GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES HUMAN RIGHTS INCOME INCREASING RETURNS INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE INEFFICIENCY INFLATION INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES INVESTIGATION JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE LABOR MARKET LABOR PRODUCTIVITY LEGAL ORIGIN LEGAL ORIGINS LEGISLATURE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MACROECONOMICS MONOPOLIES MOTIVATIONS MUNICIPALITIES NATIONAL LEVEL PERSONAL GAIN POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ELITES POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICIAN POLITICIANS POOR PERFORMANCE PRESIDENCY PRIVATE OWNERSHIP PRIVATISATION PRIVATIZATION PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC DEBT PUBLIC UTILITIES REAL GDP REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY CAPTURE REGULATORY POLICY REGULATORY QUALITY REVERSE CAUSALITY RULE OF LAW RULING PARTY SECTORAL POLICIES SEPARATION OF POWERS SOCIAL WELFARE STATE ENTERPRISE TELECOMMUNICATIONS TOTAL COSTS TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENT REGULATION TRANSPORT UNEMPLOYMENT URBANIZATION WAGES
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/08/18091392/infrastructure-reforms-reduce-effect-corruption-theory-evidence-latin-america-caribbean http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15925

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/08/18091392/infrastructure-reforms-reduce-effect-corruption-theory-evidence-latin-america-caribbean
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15925

Do Infrastructure Reforms Reduce the Effect of Corruption? Theory and Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean

Internet

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