When Competition Corrupts : A Theoretical Analysis of Market Structure and the Incidence of Corruption

When Competition Corrupts : A Theoretical Analysis of Market Structure and the Incidence of Corruption

The paper develops a simple model to demonstrate that, paradoxically, greater competition may exacerbate the problem of corruption. Market participants engaging in corrupt practices enjoy lower production costs -- maybe because they pay a bribe to...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Basu, Kaushik, McGavock, Tamara, Zhang, Boyang
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2013
Subjects:
BRIBE
BRIBERY
BRIBES
COLLUSION
COMPETITIVENESS
CORRUPT
CORRUPT PEOPLE
CORRUPT PRACTICES
CORRUPTION
CRIME
DISCRIMINATION
ENTREPRENEUR
ENTREPRENEURS
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
FIRMS
INTERNATIONAL LAW
INVISIBLE HAND
JUSTICE
MARKET COMPETITION
MARKET FAILURES
MARKET PRICE
MARKET STRUCTURE
POLICE
SHOP
SHOPS
SURPLUS
WILL
industrial organization
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/09/18221190/competition-corrupts-theoretical-analysis-market-structure-incidence-corruption
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16047

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/09/18221190/competition-corrupts-theoretical-analysis-market-structure-incidence-corruption
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16047

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