When Competition Corrupts : A Theoretical Analysis of Market Structure and the Incidence of Corruption

The paper develops a simple model to demonstrate that, paradoxically, greater competition may exacerbate the problem of corruption. Market participants engaging in corrupt practices enjoy lower production costs -- maybe because they pay a bribe to...

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Main Authors:	Basu, Kaushik, McGavock, Tamara, Zhang, Boyang
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2013
Subjects:	BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES COLLUSION COMPETITIVENESS CORRUPT CORRUPT PEOPLE CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CRIME DISCRIMINATION ENTREPRENEUR ENTREPRENEURS ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS FIRMS INTERNATIONAL LAW INVISIBLE HAND JUSTICE MARKET COMPETITION MARKET FAILURES MARKET PRICE MARKET STRUCTURE POLICE SHOP SHOPS SURPLUS WILL industrial organization
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/09/18221190/competition-corrupts-theoretical-analysis-market-structure-incidence-corruption http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16047

id	okr-10986-16047
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-160472021-04-23T14:03:27Z When Competition Corrupts : A Theoretical Analysis of Market Structure and the Incidence of Corruption Basu, Kaushik McGavock, Tamara Zhang, Boyang BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES COLLUSION COMPETITIVENESS CORRUPT CORRUPT PEOPLE CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CRIME DISCRIMINATION ENTREPRENEUR ENTREPRENEURS ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS FIRMS INTERNATIONAL LAW INVISIBLE HAND JUSTICE MARKET COMPETITION MARKET FAILURES MARKET PRICE MARKET STRUCTURE POLICE SHOP SHOPS SURPLUS WILL industrial organization The paper develops a simple model to demonstrate that, paradoxically, greater competition may exacerbate the problem of corruption. Market participants engaging in corrupt practices enjoy lower production costs -- maybe because they pay a bribe to avoid installing the environmental safeguards required by law -- such that honest players are driven out of the market when the market becomes sufficiently competitive. 2013-10-02T21:58:01Z 2013-10-02T21:58:01Z 2013-09 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/09/18221190/competition-corrupts-theoretical-analysis-market-structure-incidence-corruption http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16047 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6596 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES COLLUSION COMPETITIVENESS CORRUPT CORRUPT PEOPLE CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CRIME DISCRIMINATION ENTREPRENEUR ENTREPRENEURS ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS FIRMS INTERNATIONAL LAW INVISIBLE HAND JUSTICE MARKET COMPETITION MARKET FAILURES MARKET PRICE MARKET STRUCTURE POLICE SHOP SHOPS SURPLUS WILL industrial organization
spellingShingle	BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES COLLUSION COMPETITIVENESS CORRUPT CORRUPT PEOPLE CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CRIME DISCRIMINATION ENTREPRENEUR ENTREPRENEURS ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS FIRMS INTERNATIONAL LAW INVISIBLE HAND JUSTICE MARKET COMPETITION MARKET FAILURES MARKET PRICE MARKET STRUCTURE POLICE SHOP SHOPS SURPLUS WILL industrial organization Basu, Kaushik McGavock, Tamara Zhang, Boyang When Competition Corrupts : A Theoretical Analysis of Market Structure and the Incidence of Corruption
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6596
description	The paper develops a simple model to demonstrate that, paradoxically, greater competition may exacerbate the problem of corruption. Market participants engaging in corrupt practices enjoy lower production costs -- maybe because they pay a bribe to avoid installing the environmental safeguards required by law -- such that honest players are driven out of the market when the market becomes sufficiently competitive.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Basu, Kaushik McGavock, Tamara Zhang, Boyang
author_facet	Basu, Kaushik McGavock, Tamara Zhang, Boyang
author_sort	Basu, Kaushik
title	When Competition Corrupts : A Theoretical Analysis of Market Structure and the Incidence of Corruption
title_short	When Competition Corrupts : A Theoretical Analysis of Market Structure and the Incidence of Corruption
title_full	When Competition Corrupts : A Theoretical Analysis of Market Structure and the Incidence of Corruption
title_fullStr	When Competition Corrupts : A Theoretical Analysis of Market Structure and the Incidence of Corruption
title_full_unstemmed	When Competition Corrupts : A Theoretical Analysis of Market Structure and the Incidence of Corruption
title_sort	when competition corrupts : a theoretical analysis of market structure and the incidence of corruption
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2013
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/09/18221190/competition-corrupts-theoretical-analysis-market-structure-incidence-corruption http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16047
_version_	1764432118659678208

When Competition Corrupts : A Theoretical Analysis of Market Structure and the Incidence of Corruption

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