Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents : Taxes Versus Quantities

This paper studies a dynamic game where each of two large blocs, of fossil fuel importers and exporters respectively, sets either taxes or quotas to exercise power in fossil-fuel markets. The main novel feature is the inclusion of a "fringe&qu...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Karp, Larry, Siddiqui, Sauleh, Strand, Jon
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/10/18447749/dynamic-climate-policy-both-strategic-non-strategic-agents-taxes-versus-quantities
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16894