Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents : Taxes Versus Quantities
This paper studies a dynamic game where each of two large blocs, of fossil fuel importers and exporters respectively, sets either taxes or quotas to exercise power in fossil-fuel markets. The main novel feature is the inclusion of a "fringe&qu...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/10/18447749/dynamic-climate-policy-both-strategic-non-strategic-agents-taxes-versus-quantities http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16894 |
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okr-10986-168942021-04-23T14:03:32Z Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents : Taxes Versus Quantities Karp, Larry Siddiqui, Sauleh Strand, Jon ABATEMENT ACCOUNTING AGGREGATE DEMAND AGGREGATE SUPPLY AVERAGE PRODUCTION COSTS BENCHMARK BUDGET CAPS CARBON EMISSIONS CARBON TAX CHECK CHOICE CLIMATE CLIMATE DAMAGES CLIMATE POLICY COMMODITY COMMODITY MARKETS COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS CONSUMPTION DAMAGES DEMAND DEMAND CURVE DEMAND CURVES DEMAND ELASTICITY DEMAND FUNCTION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISCOUNT DISCOUNT FACTOR DISCOUNT RATE DISCOUNTED VALUE DOMESTIC PRICE DOMESTIC PRODUCTION DYNAMIC MODEL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC RESEARCH ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF DEMAND ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY EMISSIONS EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM PRICE EQUILIBRIUM PRICES EQUILIBRIUM VALUES EXCESS DEMAND EXCESS SUPPLY EXCHANGE EXPORTER EXPORTERS EXPORTS EXTERNALITY FREE RIDER FREE TRADE FUEL PRICES FUTURE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL GOOD IMPLICIT TAX IMPORTS INCENTIVES INELASTIC DEMAND INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENTS INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS energy environment This paper studies a dynamic game where each of two large blocs, of fossil fuel importers and exporters respectively, sets either taxes or quotas to exercise power in fossil-fuel markets. The main novel feature is the inclusion of a "fringe" of non- strategic (emerging and developing) countries which both consume and produce fossil fuels. Cumulated emissions over time from global fossil fuel consumption create climate damages which are considered by both the strategic importer and the non-strategic countries. Markov perfect equilibria are examined under the four combinations of trade policies and compared with the corresponding static games where climate damages are given (not stock-related). The main results are that taxes always dominate quota policies for both the strategic importer and exporter and that "fringe"countries bene?t from a tax policy as compared with a quota policy for the strategic importer, as the import fuel price then is lower, and the strategic importer's fuel consumption is also lower, thus causing fewer climate damages. 2014-02-04T20:40:45Z 2014-02-04T20:40:45Z 2013-10 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/10/18447749/dynamic-climate-policy-both-strategic-non-strategic-agents-taxes-versus-quantities http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16894 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6679 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ABATEMENT ACCOUNTING AGGREGATE DEMAND AGGREGATE SUPPLY AVERAGE PRODUCTION COSTS BENCHMARK BUDGET CAPS CARBON EMISSIONS CARBON TAX CHECK CHOICE CLIMATE CLIMATE DAMAGES CLIMATE POLICY COMMODITY COMMODITY MARKETS COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS CONSUMPTION DAMAGES DEMAND DEMAND CURVE DEMAND CURVES DEMAND ELASTICITY DEMAND FUNCTION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISCOUNT DISCOUNT FACTOR DISCOUNT RATE DISCOUNTED VALUE DOMESTIC PRICE DOMESTIC PRODUCTION DYNAMIC MODEL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC RESEARCH ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF DEMAND ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY EMISSIONS EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM PRICE EQUILIBRIUM PRICES EQUILIBRIUM VALUES EXCESS DEMAND EXCESS SUPPLY EXCHANGE EXPORTER EXPORTERS EXPORTS EXTERNALITY FREE RIDER FREE TRADE FUEL PRICES FUTURE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL GOOD IMPLICIT TAX IMPORTS INCENTIVES INELASTIC DEMAND INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENTS INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS energy environment |
| spellingShingle |
ABATEMENT ACCOUNTING AGGREGATE DEMAND AGGREGATE SUPPLY AVERAGE PRODUCTION COSTS BENCHMARK BUDGET CAPS CARBON EMISSIONS CARBON TAX CHECK CHOICE CLIMATE CLIMATE DAMAGES CLIMATE POLICY COMMODITY COMMODITY MARKETS COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS CONSUMPTION DAMAGES DEMAND DEMAND CURVE DEMAND CURVES DEMAND ELASTICITY DEMAND FUNCTION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISCOUNT DISCOUNT FACTOR DISCOUNT RATE DISCOUNTED VALUE DOMESTIC PRICE DOMESTIC PRODUCTION DYNAMIC MODEL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC RESEARCH ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF DEMAND ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY EMISSIONS EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM PRICE EQUILIBRIUM PRICES EQUILIBRIUM VALUES EXCESS DEMAND EXCESS SUPPLY EXCHANGE EXPORTER EXPORTERS EXPORTS EXTERNALITY FREE RIDER FREE TRADE FUEL PRICES FUTURE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL GOOD IMPLICIT TAX IMPORTS INCENTIVES INELASTIC DEMAND INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENTS INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS energy environment Karp, Larry Siddiqui, Sauleh Strand, Jon Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents : Taxes Versus Quantities |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6679 |
| description |
This paper studies a dynamic game where
each of two large blocs, of fossil fuel importers and
exporters respectively, sets either taxes or quotas to
exercise power in fossil-fuel markets. The main novel
feature is the inclusion of a "fringe" of non-
strategic (emerging and developing) countries which both
consume and produce fossil fuels. Cumulated emissions over
time from global fossil fuel consumption create climate
damages which are considered by both the strategic importer
and the non-strategic countries. Markov perfect equilibria
are examined under the four combinations of trade policies
and compared with the corresponding static games where
climate damages are given (not stock-related). The main
results are that taxes always dominate quota policies for
both the strategic importer and exporter and that
"fringe"countries bene?t from a tax policy as
compared with a quota policy for the strategic importer, as
the import fuel price then is lower, and the strategic
importer's fuel consumption is also lower, thus causing
fewer climate damages. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Karp, Larry Siddiqui, Sauleh Strand, Jon |
| author_facet |
Karp, Larry Siddiqui, Sauleh Strand, Jon |
| author_sort |
Karp, Larry |
| title |
Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents : Taxes Versus Quantities |
| title_short |
Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents : Taxes Versus Quantities |
| title_full |
Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents : Taxes Versus Quantities |
| title_fullStr |
Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents : Taxes Versus Quantities |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents : Taxes Versus Quantities |
| title_sort |
dynamic climate policy with both strategic and non-strategic agents : taxes versus quantities |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/10/18447749/dynamic-climate-policy-both-strategic-non-strategic-agents-taxes-versus-quantities http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16894 |
| _version_ |
1764434838041919488 |