Targeting Child Labor in Debt Bondage : Evidence, Theory, and Policy Implications

Despite recent multilateral efforts to single out child labor in debt bondage as one of the worst forms of child labor, several important questions have yet to be addressed: How pervasive is the phenomenon? Are there systematic correlations between...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Basu, Arnab K., Chau, Nancy H.
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English en_US
Published:	Washington, DC: World Bank 2014
Subjects:	ABSENCE OF CREDIT ACCESS TO CREDIT ACCESS TO FORMAL CREDIT ACCOUNT ACCOUNTING AGRARIAN REFORMS AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS ALTERNATIVE CREDIT BANKS BENEFICIARIES BONDED LABOR BORROWING BUDGET CONSTRAINTS CHECKS CHILD LABOR CHILD LABOUR CONSUMPTION SMOOTHING CORE LABOR STANDARDS COST OF LOANS CREDIT ACCESS CREDIT AGENCIES CREDIT AGENCY CREDIT INCREASES CREDIT MARKET CREDIT MARKETS CREDIT POLICY CREDIT PROGRAM CREDIT RATIONING CREDIT SOURCE CREDIT SOURCES DEBT DEBT OBLIGATIONS DEBT REPAYMENT DEBT REPAYMENTS DEBTOR DEBTS DEMAND FOR CREDIT DEMOCRACY DEPOSIT DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DISPOSABLE INCOME DUMMY VARIABLES EARNINGS ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS ECONOMIC COOPERATION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS EMPLOYERS EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES EXPENDITURES EXPLOITATION EXPORTER EXPORTERS FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL MARKET FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL SYSTEMS FORCED LABOUR GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT HAZARDOUS LABOR HOUSEHOLD DEBT HOUSEHOLD DEBTS HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS HOUSEHOLD WELFARE HUMAN RIGHTS ID IMPLICIT INTEREST INCIDENCE OF DEBT INCOME INCOME LEVEL INCOME SHOCKS INCOME VARIABILITY INDEBTED HOUSEHOLDS INEQUALITY INFORMAL CREDIT INSURANCE INSURANCE MARKETS INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS INTERNATIONAL TRADE LABOR LAWS LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKETS LABOR PRODUCTIVITY LABOR STANDARD LABOR SUPPLY LABORERS LACK OF ACCESS LAWS LEGISLATION LIQUIDATION LOAN LOAN PAYMENTS LOAN REPAYMENT MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES MARKET CONDITIONS MARKET DEVELOPMENT MARKET RETURNS MONEYLENDERS OPPORTUNITY COST OUTSTANDING DEBT OUTSTANDING DEBTS OUTSTANDING LOANS PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINT POLITICAL ECONOMY PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP PRIVATE CREDIT PRODUCTIVITY REAL INCOME RISK OF DEFAULT RURAL LABOR SAVINGS SLAVERY SMALL BUSINESS SMALL BUSINESS LOANS SOCIAL EXCLUSION SOURCE OF CREDIT SOURCES OF CREDIT SOURCES OF CREDITS SPOT MARKET TRADE LAWS UNION UNIONS USURY WAGES
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/05/17742203/targeting-child-labor-debt-bondage-evidence-theory-policy-implications http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17175

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http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/05/17742203/targeting-child-labor-debt-bondage-evidence-theory-policy-implications
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17175

Targeting Child Labor in Debt Bondage : Evidence, Theory, and Policy Implications

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