Financial Dollarization and Central Bank Credibility

Financial Dollarization and Central Bank Credibility

Why do firms and banks hold foreign currency denominated liabilities? The authors argue that foreign currency debt, by altering the effect of a devaluation on output, has a disciplining effect when the Central Bank's objectives differ from the...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Cowan, Kevin, Do, Quy-Toan
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:	DOLLAR STANDARD CENTRAL BANKS FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS MONETARY POLICY INFORMATION ACCOUNTING ADVERSE EFFECTS AGGREGATE DEMAND ARBITRAGE AVERAGE INFLATION BALANCE SHEETS BORROWING CAPACITY BUILDING CAPITAL ACCOUNT CENTRAL BANK CENTRAL BANK CREDIBILITY COMPETITIVENESS DEBT DEPOSITS DEVALUATION DISTORTIONARY EFFECTS EMERGING ECONOMIES EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS EXCHANGE RATE EXCHANGE RATE DEPRECIATION EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES EXCHANGE RATE POLICY EXCHANGE RATE REGIME EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES EXCHANGE RATE RISK EXCHANGE RATES FINANCIAL CONTRACTS FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION FINANCIAL FRAGILITY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FOREIGN CURRENCY FOREIGN CURRENCY DEBT FUNCTIONAL FORMS GOVERNMENT DEBT INCOME INFLATION INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INSURANCE INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES LIQUIDITY MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES MARGINAL BENEFITS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COSTS MARKET ECONOMIES MONETARY AUTHORITIES MONETARY AUTHORITY MORAL HAZARD NET WORTH OPTIMIZATION PERFECT COMPETITION PERFECT INFORMATION POLICY CREDIBILITY POLICY RESEARCH PORTFOLIO PORTFOLIOS PRIVATE AGENTS PRODUCTIVITY PURCHASING POWER RISK AVERSE SAVINGS TAXATION UTILITY FUNCTION ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/06/2438507/financial-dollarization-central-bank-credibility http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18170

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/06/2438507/financial-dollarization-central-bank-credibility
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18170