The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies

The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies

Deposit insurance schemes and bank failure resolution systems are asked to fulfill conflicting public policy objectives: on the one hand, they are supposed to protect small depositors and prevent contagion risks from bank runs; on the other hand, t...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Beck, Thorsten
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
ACCOUNTABILITY
ADVERSE SELECTION
AGENTS
APPLICATIONS
AUDITING
AUDITS
BALANCE SHEET
BANK DEPOSITS
BANK FAILURE
BANK FAILURE RESOLUTION
BANK FAILURES
BANK INSOLVENCY
BANK MANAGEMENT
BANK REGULATION
BANK RUNS
BANK SUPERVISION
BANKING CRISES
BANKING CRISIS
BANKING INDUSTRY
BANKING SECTOR
BANKING STRUCTURE
BANKING SYSTEM
BANKRUPTCY
BANKS
CAPITAL BASE
CENTRAL BANK
COINSURANCE
COMMERCIAL BANKS
COMPENSATION
CONTAGION
COOPERATIVE BANKS
COUNTRY COMPARISONS
CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE
DEPOSIT INSURANCE
DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE
DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES
DEPOSITOR PROTECTION
DEPOSITORS
DEPOSITS
EXPLICIT COVERAGE
FINANCIAL FRAGILITY
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION
FINANCIAL RISK
FINANCIAL STABILITY
IMPAIRED ASSETS
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
INSURANCE
INSURANCE FUNDS
INSURED DEPOSITS
INSURERS
INTEREST RATES
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
LAWS
LENDER OF LAST RESORT
LIQUID ASSETS
LIQUIDATION
LIQUIDATION OF BANKS
LIQUIDITY
LOOTING
MANDATES
MARKET DISCIPLINE
MORAL HAZARD
PENALTIES
PREMIUMS
PRIVATIZATION
PUBLIC POLICY
REGULATION
REGULATORY FORBEARANCE
RISK ASSESSMENT
RISK MANAGEMENT
RISK PREMIUM
RISK TAKING
SAVINGS
SAVINGS BANKS
SHAREHOLDERS
SMALL BANKS
STOCK PRICES
SUBORDINATED DEBT
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES
TRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCE
SAFETY NET POLICIES
CREDITORS
MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
INSURANCE PREMIUMS
SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS
TRANSPARENCY
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/05/2329634/incentive-compatible-design-deposit-insurance-bank-failure-resolution-concepts-country-studies
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18210

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/05/2329634/incentive-compatible-design-deposit-insurance-bank-failure-resolution-concepts-country-studies
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18210

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