The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies
Deposit insurance schemes and bank failure resolution systems are asked to fulfill conflicting public policy objectives: on the one hand, they are supposed to protect small depositors and prevent contagion risks from bank runs; on the other hand, t...
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/05/2329634/incentive-compatible-design-deposit-insurance-bank-failure-resolution-concepts-country-studies http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18210 |
Summary: | Deposit insurance schemes and bank
failure resolution systems are asked to fulfill conflicting
public policy objectives: on the one hand, they are supposed
to protect small depositors and prevent contagion risks from
bank runs; on the other hand, they are supposed to minimize
aggressive risk taking by banks. Beck discusses the
incentive-compatible design and interaction of both
components of the financial safety net and describes and
compares three countries with different safety net
arrangements-Brazil, Germany, and Russia. |
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