The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies

Deposit insurance schemes and bank failure resolution systems are asked to fulfill conflicting public policy objectives: on the one hand, they are supposed to protect small depositors and prevent contagion risks from bank runs; on the other hand, t...

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Main Author:	Beck, Thorsten
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:	ACCOUNTABILITY ADVERSE SELECTION AGENTS APPLICATIONS AUDITING AUDITS BALANCE SHEET BANK DEPOSITS BANK FAILURE BANK FAILURE RESOLUTION BANK FAILURES BANK INSOLVENCY BANK MANAGEMENT BANK REGULATION BANK RUNS BANK SUPERVISION BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING INDUSTRY BANKING SECTOR BANKING STRUCTURE BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKS CAPITAL BASE CENTRAL BANK COINSURANCE COMMERCIAL BANKS COMPENSATION CONTAGION COOPERATIVE BANKS COUNTRY COMPARISONS CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSITOR PROTECTION DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS EXPLICIT COVERAGE FINANCIAL FRAGILITY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION FINANCIAL RISK FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPAIRED ASSETS INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE FUNDS INSURED DEPOSITS INSURERS INTEREST RATES JUDICIAL SYSTEMS LAWS LENDER OF LAST RESORT LIQUID ASSETS LIQUIDATION LIQUIDATION OF BANKS LIQUIDITY LOOTING MANDATES MARKET DISCIPLINE MORAL HAZARD PENALTIES PREMIUMS PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC POLICY REGULATION REGULATORY FORBEARANCE RISK ASSESSMENT RISK MANAGEMENT RISK PREMIUM RISK TAKING SAVINGS SAVINGS BANKS SHAREHOLDERS SMALL BANKS STOCK PRICES SUBORDINATED DEBT SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES TRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCE SAFETY NET POLICIES CREDITORS MARKET EQUILIBRIUM INSURANCE PREMIUMS SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS TRANSPARENCY
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/05/2329634/incentive-compatible-design-deposit-insurance-bank-failure-resolution-concepts-country-studies http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18210

id	okr-10986-18210
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-182102021-04-23T14:03:41Z The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies Beck, Thorsten ACCOUNTABILITY ADVERSE SELECTION AGENTS APPLICATIONS AUDITING AUDITS BALANCE SHEET BANK DEPOSITS BANK FAILURE BANK FAILURE RESOLUTION BANK FAILURES BANK INSOLVENCY BANK MANAGEMENT BANK REGULATION BANK RUNS BANK SUPERVISION BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING INDUSTRY BANKING SECTOR BANKING STRUCTURE BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKS CAPITAL BASE CENTRAL BANK COINSURANCE COMMERCIAL BANKS COMPENSATION CONTAGION COOPERATIVE BANKS COUNTRY COMPARISONS CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSITOR PROTECTION DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS EXPLICIT COVERAGE FINANCIAL FRAGILITY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION FINANCIAL RISK FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPAIRED ASSETS INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE FUNDS INSURED DEPOSITS INSURERS INTEREST RATES JUDICIAL SYSTEMS LAWS LENDER OF LAST RESORT LIQUID ASSETS LIQUIDATION LIQUIDATION OF BANKS LIQUIDITY LOOTING MANDATES MARKET DISCIPLINE MORAL HAZARD PENALTIES PREMIUMS PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC POLICY REGULATION REGULATORY FORBEARANCE RISK ASSESSMENT RISK MANAGEMENT RISK PREMIUM RISK TAKING SAVINGS SAVINGS BANKS SHAREHOLDERS SMALL BANKS STOCK PRICES SUBORDINATED DEBT SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES TRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCE PUBLIC POLICY SAFETY NET POLICIES CREDITORS BANK MANAGEMENT MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AUDITING INSURANCE PREMIUMS SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS TRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCE Deposit insurance schemes and bank failure resolution systems are asked to fulfill conflicting public policy objectives: on the one hand, they are supposed to protect small depositors and prevent contagion risks from bank runs; on the other hand, they are supposed to minimize aggressive risk taking by banks. Beck discusses the incentive-compatible design and interaction of both components of the financial safety net and describes and compares three countries with different safety net arrangements-Brazil, Germany, and Russia. 2014-05-09T18:27:59Z 2014-05-09T18:27:59Z 2003-05 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/05/2329634/incentive-compatible-design-deposit-insurance-bank-failure-resolution-concepts-country-studies http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18210 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3043 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Europe and Central Asia Latin America & Caribbean
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	ACCOUNTABILITY ADVERSE SELECTION AGENTS APPLICATIONS AUDITING AUDITS BALANCE SHEET BANK DEPOSITS BANK FAILURE BANK FAILURE RESOLUTION BANK FAILURES BANK INSOLVENCY BANK MANAGEMENT BANK REGULATION BANK RUNS BANK SUPERVISION BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING INDUSTRY BANKING SECTOR BANKING STRUCTURE BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKS CAPITAL BASE CENTRAL BANK COINSURANCE COMMERCIAL BANKS COMPENSATION CONTAGION COOPERATIVE BANKS COUNTRY COMPARISONS CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSITOR PROTECTION DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS EXPLICIT COVERAGE FINANCIAL FRAGILITY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION FINANCIAL RISK FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPAIRED ASSETS INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE FUNDS INSURED DEPOSITS INSURERS INTEREST RATES JUDICIAL SYSTEMS LAWS LENDER OF LAST RESORT LIQUID ASSETS LIQUIDATION LIQUIDATION OF BANKS LIQUIDITY LOOTING MANDATES MARKET DISCIPLINE MORAL HAZARD PENALTIES PREMIUMS PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC POLICY REGULATION REGULATORY FORBEARANCE RISK ASSESSMENT RISK MANAGEMENT RISK PREMIUM RISK TAKING SAVINGS SAVINGS BANKS SHAREHOLDERS SMALL BANKS STOCK PRICES SUBORDINATED DEBT SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES TRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCE PUBLIC POLICY SAFETY NET POLICIES CREDITORS BANK MANAGEMENT MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AUDITING INSURANCE PREMIUMS SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS TRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCE
spellingShingle	ACCOUNTABILITY ADVERSE SELECTION AGENTS APPLICATIONS AUDITING AUDITS BALANCE SHEET BANK DEPOSITS BANK FAILURE BANK FAILURE RESOLUTION BANK FAILURES BANK INSOLVENCY BANK MANAGEMENT BANK REGULATION BANK RUNS BANK SUPERVISION BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING INDUSTRY BANKING SECTOR BANKING STRUCTURE BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKS CAPITAL BASE CENTRAL BANK COINSURANCE COMMERCIAL BANKS COMPENSATION CONTAGION COOPERATIVE BANKS COUNTRY COMPARISONS CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSITOR PROTECTION DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS EXPLICIT COVERAGE FINANCIAL FRAGILITY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION FINANCIAL RISK FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPAIRED ASSETS INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE FUNDS INSURED DEPOSITS INSURERS INTEREST RATES JUDICIAL SYSTEMS LAWS LENDER OF LAST RESORT LIQUID ASSETS LIQUIDATION LIQUIDATION OF BANKS LIQUIDITY LOOTING MANDATES MARKET DISCIPLINE MORAL HAZARD PENALTIES PREMIUMS PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC POLICY REGULATION REGULATORY FORBEARANCE RISK ASSESSMENT RISK MANAGEMENT RISK PREMIUM RISK TAKING SAVINGS SAVINGS BANKS SHAREHOLDERS SMALL BANKS STOCK PRICES SUBORDINATED DEBT SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES TRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCE PUBLIC POLICY SAFETY NET POLICIES CREDITORS BANK MANAGEMENT MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AUDITING INSURANCE PREMIUMS SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS TRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCE Beck, Thorsten The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies
geographic_facet	Europe and Central Asia Latin America & Caribbean
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3043
description	Deposit insurance schemes and bank failure resolution systems are asked to fulfill conflicting public policy objectives: on the one hand, they are supposed to protect small depositors and prevent contagion risks from bank runs; on the other hand, they are supposed to minimize aggressive risk taking by banks. Beck discusses the incentive-compatible design and interaction of both components of the financial safety net and describes and compares three countries with different safety net arrangements-Brazil, Germany, and Russia.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Beck, Thorsten
author_facet	Beck, Thorsten
author_sort	Beck, Thorsten
title	The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies
title_short	The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies
title_full	The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies
title_fullStr	The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies
title_full_unstemmed	The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies
title_sort	incentive-compatible design of deposit insurance and bank failure resolution : concepts and country studies
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2014
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/05/2329634/incentive-compatible-design-deposit-insurance-bank-failure-resolution-concepts-country-studies http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18210
_version_	1764439142374047744

The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies

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