Bank Privatization in Argentina : A Model of Political Constraints and Differential Outcomes

Bank Privatization in Argentina : A Model of Political Constraints and Differential Outcomes

Based on results from country case studies, many researchers have claimed that political constraints affect bank privatization transactions, which in turn affect the post-privatization performance of the banking sector. But no study has either econ...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Clarke, George R.G., Cull, Robert
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
BANK ASSETS
BANK DEPOSITS
BANK FAILURE
BANK PERFORMANCE
BANK PRIVATIZATION
BANKING SECTOR
BANKING SERVICES
BANKRUPTCY
BANKS
BIDDERS
BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
CAPITALIZATION
CENTRAL BANK
CITIES
COMPETITION POLICY
DEPOSITORS
DEPOSITS
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS
EMPLOYMENT
EQUILIBRIUM
EXPECTED RETURN
FACE VALUE
FINANCIAL SECTOR
FISCAL DEFICITS
FOREIGN INVESTORS
FORMAL ANALYSIS
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES
INFLATION
INSOLVENCY
INSOLVENT BANKS
INTEREST INCOME
INTEREST RATE
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES
LABOR UNIONS
LAWS
LENDER OF LAST RESORT
LIQUIDITY
MARGINAL VALUE
OPERATING COSTS
OPTIMIZATION
POLITICAL ECONOMY
PORTFOLIO
PREDICTIONS
PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
PROVINCIAL BANKS
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
RETIREMENT
RETURN ON ASSETS
SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
SOLVENCY
TIME CONSTRAINTS
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
UTILITY FUNCTION
VOTERS
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/07/1552019/bank-privatization-argentina-model-political-constraints-differential-outcomes
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19582

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/07/1552019/bank-privatization-argentina-model-political-constraints-differential-outcomes
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19582

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