Ownership Structure and the Temptation to Loot : Evidence from Privatized Firms in the Czech Republic

Ownership Structure and the Temptation to Loot : Evidence from Privatized Firms in the Czech Republic

Using a new data set on privatized firms in the Czech Republic, the authors examine how the design of privatization affects outcomes. Earlier studies of privatization in the Czech Republic focused largely on how the broad distribution of shares thr...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Cull, Robert, Matesova, Jana, Shirley, Mary
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
ASSETS
AUCTION
AUCTIONS
BANK LOANS
BANKRUPTCY
BID
BIDDING
CAPITAL MARKETS
COMPANY
COMPETITION POLICY
CORPORATE CONTROL
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
DEBT
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DISCOUNTED VALUE
DIVIDENDS
ECONOMIC RESEARCH
ECONOMIC VALUE
ECONOMICS RESEARCH
EXPROPRIATION
FIXED ASSETS
FOREIGN FIRMS
GROWTH RATE
JOINT STOCK COMPANIES
LARGE ENTERPRISES
LARGE SHAREHOLDERS
OPTIMIZATION
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
PRODUCTIVE ASSETS
PROFITABILITY
ROA
SHAREHOLDERS
SMALL ENTERPRISES
SOLE PROPRIETORSHIPS
STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES
STATEMENTS
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
UNEMPLOYMENT
WEALTH
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/03/1047468/ownership-structure-temptation-loot-evidence-privatized-firms-czech-republic
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19690

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/03/1047468/ownership-structure-temptation-loot-evidence-privatized-firms-czech-republic
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19690

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