Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross-Section of Firms

Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross-Section of Firms

The author exploits a unique data set on corruption containing information about estimated bribe payments by Ugandan firms. To guide the empirical analysis, he develops a simple rent-extortion model, which yields predictions on both the incidence o...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Svensson, Jakob
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
BRIBERY
BRIBES
CAPITAL GOODS
CIVIL SERVANTS
COMPETITIVENESS
CORRUPTION
DISCOUNTED VALUE
DISCRETION
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
EQUILIBRIUM
EXPORTS
EXTORTION
GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS
GRAFT
IMPORTS
INCOME
KICKBACKS
LABOR FORCE
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
MACROECONOMICS
MARGINAL PRODUCT
MARKET PRICES
MEDIA
PREFERENTIAL
PRINCIPAL AGENT MODEL
PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUNISHMENT
REGULATORY CAPTURE
ROBBERY
SUNK COSTS
TAXATION
THEFT
TOTAL COSTS
TRANSACTION COSTS
UNEMPLOYMENT
VALUATION
WAGES
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/11/729382/must-pay-bribes-much-evidence-cross-section-firms
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19749

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/11/729382/must-pay-bribes-much-evidence-cross-section-firms
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19749

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