Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross-Section of Firms
The author exploits a unique data set on corruption containing information about estimated bribe payments by Ugandan firms. To guide the empirical analysis, he develops a simple rent-extortion model, which yields predictions on both the incidence o...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/11/729382/must-pay-bribes-much-evidence-cross-section-firms http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19749 |
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okr-10986-197492021-04-23T14:03:44Z Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross-Section of Firms Svensson, Jakob BRIBERY BRIBES CAPITAL GOODS CIVIL SERVANTS COMPETITIVENESS CORRUPTION DISCOUNTED VALUE DISCRETION EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EQUILIBRIUM EXPORTS EXTORTION GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS GRAFT IMPORTS INCOME KICKBACKS LABOR FORCE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES MACROECONOMICS MARGINAL PRODUCT MARKET PRICES MEDIA PREFERENTIAL PRINCIPAL AGENT MODEL PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUNISHMENT REGULATORY CAPTURE ROBBERY SUNK COSTS TAXATION THEFT TOTAL COSTS TRANSACTION COSTS UNEMPLOYMENT VALUATION WAGES The author exploits a unique data set on corruption containing information about estimated bribe payments by Ugandan firms. To guide the empirical analysis, he develops a simple rent-extortion model, which yields predictions on both the incidence of bribery, and the amount paid. Both predictions are consistent with the data. Firms typically have to pay bribes when dealing with public officials whose actions directly affect the firms' business operations. And the amount paid in bribes is not a fixed sum for a set of public services, but depends on the firm's ability to pay. Controlling for other potential explanations of the relationship between "ability to pay" and equilibrium graft, the author shows that the more a firm can pay, the more it has to pay. 2014-08-27T16:46:47Z 2014-08-27T16:46:47Z 2000-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/11/729382/must-pay-bribes-much-evidence-cross-section-firms http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19749 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2486 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Africa Uganda |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
BRIBERY BRIBES CAPITAL GOODS CIVIL SERVANTS COMPETITIVENESS CORRUPTION DISCOUNTED VALUE DISCRETION EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EQUILIBRIUM EXPORTS EXTORTION GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS GRAFT IMPORTS INCOME KICKBACKS LABOR FORCE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES MACROECONOMICS MARGINAL PRODUCT MARKET PRICES MEDIA PREFERENTIAL PRINCIPAL AGENT MODEL PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUNISHMENT REGULATORY CAPTURE ROBBERY SUNK COSTS TAXATION THEFT TOTAL COSTS TRANSACTION COSTS UNEMPLOYMENT VALUATION WAGES |
| spellingShingle |
BRIBERY BRIBES CAPITAL GOODS CIVIL SERVANTS COMPETITIVENESS CORRUPTION DISCOUNTED VALUE DISCRETION EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EQUILIBRIUM EXPORTS EXTORTION GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS GRAFT IMPORTS INCOME KICKBACKS LABOR FORCE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES MACROECONOMICS MARGINAL PRODUCT MARKET PRICES MEDIA PREFERENTIAL PRINCIPAL AGENT MODEL PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUNISHMENT REGULATORY CAPTURE ROBBERY SUNK COSTS TAXATION THEFT TOTAL COSTS TRANSACTION COSTS UNEMPLOYMENT VALUATION WAGES Svensson, Jakob Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross-Section of Firms |
| geographic_facet |
Africa Uganda |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2486 |
| description |
The author exploits a unique data set on
corruption containing information about estimated bribe
payments by Ugandan firms. To guide the empirical analysis,
he develops a simple rent-extortion model, which yields
predictions on both the incidence of bribery, and the amount
paid. Both predictions are consistent with the data. Firms
typically have to pay bribes when dealing with public
officials whose actions directly affect the firms'
business operations. And the amount paid in bribes is not a
fixed sum for a set of public services, but depends on the
firm's ability to pay. Controlling for other potential
explanations of the relationship between "ability to
pay" and equilibrium graft, the author shows that the
more a firm can pay, the more it has to pay. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Svensson, Jakob |
| author_facet |
Svensson, Jakob |
| author_sort |
Svensson, Jakob |
| title |
Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross-Section of Firms |
| title_short |
Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross-Section of Firms |
| title_full |
Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross-Section of Firms |
| title_fullStr |
Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross-Section of Firms |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross-Section of Firms |
| title_sort |
who must pay bribes and how much? evidence from a cross-section of firms |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/11/729382/must-pay-bribes-much-evidence-cross-section-firms http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19749 |
| _version_ |
1764440536154898432 |