Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions : When Are Independent Central Banks Irrelevent?

Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions : When Are Independent Central Banks Irrelevent?

The government's ability to credibly commit to policy announcements is critical to the successful implementation of economic policies as diverse as capital taxation and utilities regulation. One frequently advocated means of signaling credible...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Keefer, Philip, Stasavage, David
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
ACTUAL INFLATION
BORROWING
CENTRAL BANK
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
CENTRAL BANK LENDING
CENTRAL BANKS
COMPETITION POLICY
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
DECISION MAKING
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
DISCRETIONARY MONETARY POLICY
ECONOMIC POLICIES
ECONOMICS
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
EXPECTED VALUE
EXPECTED VALUES
GDP
IMPORTS
INCOME
INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK
INFLATION
INFLATION PREFERENCES
INFLATION RATE
IRREVERSIBILITY
LEGISLATION
LOW INFLATION
LOWER INFLATION
MONETARY POLICY
MONEY SUPPLY
POLICY DECISIONS
POLICY MAKERS
PRICE INCREASES
PRICE INFLATION
RATE OF INFLATION
TAXATION
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/06/437170/bureaucratic-delegation-political-institutions-independent-central-banks-irrelevent
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19842

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/06/437170/bureaucratic-delegation-political-institutions-independent-central-banks-irrelevent
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19842

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