High-Powered Incentives and Communication Failure

High-Powered Incentives and Communication Failure

This paper uses a donor-provider-agent framework to study the role of provider incentives for the delivery of developmental goods like aid, credit, or technology transfer to the poor. The paper considers a situation where credible communication by...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Mishra, Ajit, Sarangi, Sudipta
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2015
Subjects:
TRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGY
TECHNOLOGY
KNOWING
RISK NEUTRAL
MOTIVATION
PRODUCTION
WAGES
BASIC
PARTICIPATION
INCOME
KNOW-HOW
VALUE
GOVERNMENT
CREDIT
PROGRAMS
INFORMATION
TEXT
SERVICES
AGRICULTURE
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/06/24728266/high-powered-incentives-communication-failure
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22225

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/06/24728266/high-powered-incentives-communication-failure
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22225

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