Sharing Oil Rents and Political Violence

Sharing Oil Rents and Political Violence

This paper investigates how the devolution of oil windfalls affects the likelihood of political violence. It shows that transferring large shares of oil wealth can prevent conflict, while transferring small shares can trigger it. Among the differen...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Cordella, Tito, Onder, Harun
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2016
Subjects:
natural resources
conflict
redistribution
aggregative games
oil windfalls
political violence
subsidies reform
subnational governance
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/10/26875985/sharing-oil-rents-political-violence
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25314

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/10/26875985/sharing-oil-rents-political-violence
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25314

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