Mission and the Bottom Line : Performance Incentives in a Multi-Goal Organization

The impact of performance pay in institutions with multiple goals depends on complementarities in the disutility cost of effort and how different tasks interact to achieve each goal. Workers of a mission-oriented nonprofit were randomly assigned to...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Gine, Xavier, Mansuri, Ghazala, Shrestha, Slesh A.
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2017
Subjects:	COMPLEMENTARITIES INCENTIVES INTRINSIC MOTIVATION TEAMWORK PERFORMANCE PAY MICROCREDIT COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/757341513086147069/Mission-and-the-bottom-line-performance-incentives-in-a-multi-goal-organization http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29006

id	okr-10986-29006
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-290062021-06-08T14:42:47Z Mission and the Bottom Line : Performance Incentives in a Multi-Goal Organization Gine, Xavier Mansuri, Ghazala Shrestha, Slesh A. COMPLEMENTARITIES INCENTIVES INTRINSIC MOTIVATION TEAMWORK PERFORMANCE PAY MICROCREDIT COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS The impact of performance pay in institutions with multiple goals depends on complementarities in the disutility cost of effort and how different tasks interact to achieve each goal. Workers of a mission-oriented nonprofit were randomly assigned to one of two bonus schemes, each incentivizing one of its two main operational goals: the performance of its microcredit program and the strengthening of community institutions of the poor. This study finds that the credit bonus improved credit-related outcomes but it undermined the social outcome. In contrast, the social bonus advanced the social mission as well as the microcredit program, but only for employees working alone, undermining the performance of employees working in teams. These results cannot be explained by a standard multitask principal-agent model featuring only complementarities in the disutility cost of effort. Instead, they suggest that production complementarities are also relevant. 2017-12-15T18:06:12Z 2017-12-15T18:06:12Z 2017-12 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/757341513086147069/Mission-and-the-bottom-line-performance-incentives-in-a-multi-goal-organization http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29006 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8270 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	COMPLEMENTARITIES INCENTIVES INTRINSIC MOTIVATION TEAMWORK PERFORMANCE PAY MICROCREDIT COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS
spellingShingle	COMPLEMENTARITIES INCENTIVES INTRINSIC MOTIVATION TEAMWORK PERFORMANCE PAY MICROCREDIT COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS Gine, Xavier Mansuri, Ghazala Shrestha, Slesh A. Mission and the Bottom Line : Performance Incentives in a Multi-Goal Organization
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8270
description	The impact of performance pay in institutions with multiple goals depends on complementarities in the disutility cost of effort and how different tasks interact to achieve each goal. Workers of a mission-oriented nonprofit were randomly assigned to one of two bonus schemes, each incentivizing one of its two main operational goals: the performance of its microcredit program and the strengthening of community institutions of the poor. This study finds that the credit bonus improved credit-related outcomes but it undermined the social outcome. In contrast, the social bonus advanced the social mission as well as the microcredit program, but only for employees working alone, undermining the performance of employees working in teams. These results cannot be explained by a standard multitask principal-agent model featuring only complementarities in the disutility cost of effort. Instead, they suggest that production complementarities are also relevant.
format	Working Paper
author	Gine, Xavier Mansuri, Ghazala Shrestha, Slesh A.
author_facet	Gine, Xavier Mansuri, Ghazala Shrestha, Slesh A.
author_sort	Gine, Xavier
title	Mission and the Bottom Line : Performance Incentives in a Multi-Goal Organization
title_short	Mission and the Bottom Line : Performance Incentives in a Multi-Goal Organization
title_full	Mission and the Bottom Line : Performance Incentives in a Multi-Goal Organization
title_fullStr	Mission and the Bottom Line : Performance Incentives in a Multi-Goal Organization
title_full_unstemmed	Mission and the Bottom Line : Performance Incentives in a Multi-Goal Organization
title_sort	mission and the bottom line : performance incentives in a multi-goal organization
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2017
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/757341513086147069/Mission-and-the-bottom-line-performance-incentives-in-a-multi-goal-organization http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29006
_version_	1764468252044427264

Mission and the Bottom Line : Performance Incentives in a Multi-Goal Organization

Similar Items