Lobbying for Capital Tax Benefits and Misallocation of Resources during a Credit Crunch

Lobbying for Capital Tax Benefits and Misallocation of Resources during a Credit Crunch

Corporations often have strong incentives to exert influence on the tax code and obtain additional tax benefits through lobbying. For the U.S. financial crisis of 2007-09, this paper shows that lobbying activity intensified, driven by large firms i...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Zaourak, Gabriel
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2018
Subjects:
LOBBYING
FINANCIAL FRICTION
CREDIT MISALLOCATION
CREDIT CRUNCH
TAX POLICY
CAPITAL TAX
TAXATION
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/354941522689036064/Lobbying-for-capital-tax-benefits-and-misallocation-of-resources-during-a-credit-crunch
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29607

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/354941522689036064/Lobbying-for-capital-tax-benefits-and-misallocation-of-resources-during-a-credit-crunch
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29607

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