Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions

Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions

Education conditional cash transfer programs may increase school attendance in part due to the information they transmit to parents about their child's attendance. This paper presents experimental evidence that the information content of an ed...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: de Walque, Damien, Valente, Christine
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2018
Subjects:
CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS
ABSENTEEISM
SCHOOL ATTENDANCE
MORAL HAZARD
DROPOUT RATE
PRIMARY EDUCATION
CASH INCENTIVES
EDUCATION POLICY
TEST SCORE
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/720071529003623702/Incentivizing-school-attendance-in-the-presence-of-parent-child-information-frictions
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29905

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/720071529003623702/Incentivizing-school-attendance-in-the-presence-of-parent-child-information-frictions
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29905

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