Political Selection and Bureaucratic Productivity

Political Selection and Bureaucratic Productivity

Economic theory of public bureaucracies as complex organizations predicts that bureaucratic productivity can be shaped by the selection of different types of agents, beyond their incentives. This theory applies to the institutions of local governme...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Habyarimana, James, Khemani, Stuti, Scot, Thiago
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2018
Subjects:
BUREAUCRACY
POLITICIANS
PUBLIC SERVICES
INTEGRITY
STATE CAPACITY
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/573111544644789517/Political-Selection-and-Bureaucratic-Productivity
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/31074

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/573111544644789517/Political-Selection-and-Bureaucratic-Productivity
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/31074

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