Political Selection and Bureaucratic Productivity
Economic theory of public bureaucracies as complex organizations predicts that bureaucratic productivity can be shaped by the selection of different types of agents, beyond their incentives. This theory applies to the institutions of local governme...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2018
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/573111544644789517/Political-Selection-and-Bureaucratic-Productivity http://hdl.handle.net/10986/31074 |
| Summary: | Economic theory of public bureaucracies
as complex organizations predicts that bureaucratic
productivity can be shaped by the selection of different
types of agents, beyond their incentives. This theory
applies to the institutions of local government in the
developing world, where nationally appointed bureaucrats and
locally elected politicians together manage the
implementation of public policies and the delivery of
services. Yet, there is no evidence on whether (which)
selection traits of these bureaucrats and politicians matter
for the productivity of local bureaucracies. This paper
addresses the empirical gap by gathering rich data in an
institutional context of district governments in Uganda,
which is typical of the local state in poor countries. The
paper measures traits such as the integrity, altruism,
personality, and public service motivation of bureaucrats
and politicians. It finds robust evidence that higher
integrity among locally elected politicians is associated
with substantively better delivery of public health services
by district bureaucracies. Together with the theory, this
evidence suggests that policy makers seeking to build local
state capacity in poor countries should take political
selection seriously. |
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