Political Selection and Bureaucratic Productivity

Economic theory of public bureaucracies as complex organizations predicts that bureaucratic productivity can be shaped by the selection of different types of agents, beyond their incentives. This theory applies to the institutions of local governme...

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Main Authors:	Habyarimana, James, Khemani, Stuti, Scot, Thiago
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2018
Subjects:	BUREAUCRACY POLITICIANS PUBLIC SERVICES INTEGRITY STATE CAPACITY
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/573111544644789517/Political-Selection-and-Bureaucratic-Productivity http://hdl.handle.net/10986/31074

id	okr-10986-31074
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-310742022-09-19T12:16:37Z Political Selection and Bureaucratic Productivity Habyarimana, James Khemani, Stuti Scot, Thiago BUREAUCRACY POLITICIANS PUBLIC SERVICES INTEGRITY STATE CAPACITY Economic theory of public bureaucracies as complex organizations predicts that bureaucratic productivity can be shaped by the selection of different types of agents, beyond their incentives. This theory applies to the institutions of local government in the developing world, where nationally appointed bureaucrats and locally elected politicians together manage the implementation of public policies and the delivery of services. Yet, there is no evidence on whether (which) selection traits of these bureaucrats and politicians matter for the productivity of local bureaucracies. This paper addresses the empirical gap by gathering rich data in an institutional context of district governments in Uganda, which is typical of the local state in poor countries. The paper measures traits such as the integrity, altruism, personality, and public service motivation of bureaucrats and politicians. It finds robust evidence that higher integrity among locally elected politicians is associated with substantively better delivery of public health services by district bureaucracies. Together with the theory, this evidence suggests that policy makers seeking to build local state capacity in poor countries should take political selection seriously. 2018-12-27T21:11:51Z 2018-12-27T21:11:51Z 2018-12 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/573111544644789517/Political-Selection-and-Bureaucratic-Productivity http://hdl.handle.net/10986/31074 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8673 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Africa Uganda
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	BUREAUCRACY POLITICIANS PUBLIC SERVICES INTEGRITY STATE CAPACITY
spellingShingle	BUREAUCRACY POLITICIANS PUBLIC SERVICES INTEGRITY STATE CAPACITY Habyarimana, James Khemani, Stuti Scot, Thiago Political Selection and Bureaucratic Productivity
geographic_facet	Africa Uganda
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8673
description	Economic theory of public bureaucracies as complex organizations predicts that bureaucratic productivity can be shaped by the selection of different types of agents, beyond their incentives. This theory applies to the institutions of local government in the developing world, where nationally appointed bureaucrats and locally elected politicians together manage the implementation of public policies and the delivery of services. Yet, there is no evidence on whether (which) selection traits of these bureaucrats and politicians matter for the productivity of local bureaucracies. This paper addresses the empirical gap by gathering rich data in an institutional context of district governments in Uganda, which is typical of the local state in poor countries. The paper measures traits such as the integrity, altruism, personality, and public service motivation of bureaucrats and politicians. It finds robust evidence that higher integrity among locally elected politicians is associated with substantively better delivery of public health services by district bureaucracies. Together with the theory, this evidence suggests that policy makers seeking to build local state capacity in poor countries should take political selection seriously.
format	Working Paper
author	Habyarimana, James Khemani, Stuti Scot, Thiago
author_facet	Habyarimana, James Khemani, Stuti Scot, Thiago
author_sort	Habyarimana, James
title	Political Selection and Bureaucratic Productivity
title_short	Political Selection and Bureaucratic Productivity
title_full	Political Selection and Bureaucratic Productivity
title_fullStr	Political Selection and Bureaucratic Productivity
title_full_unstemmed	Political Selection and Bureaucratic Productivity
title_sort	political selection and bureaucratic productivity
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2018
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/573111544644789517/Political-Selection-and-Bureaucratic-Productivity http://hdl.handle.net/10986/31074
_version_	1764473547052285952

Political Selection and Bureaucratic Productivity

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