Is Short-Term Debt a Substitute or a Complement to Good Governance?

Is Short-Term Debt a Substitute or a Complement to Good Governance?

Short-term debt exposes firms to credit supply shocks and liquidity risk. Short-term debt can also reduce potential agency conflicts between managers and shareholders by exposing managers to more frequent monitoring by the market. This paper examin...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Anginer, Deniz, Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, Tepe, Mete, Simsir, Serif Aziz
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2019
Subjects:
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
BOARD INDEPENDENCE
SHORT-TERM DEBT
INVESTOR PROTECTION
LEGAL ORIGIN
AGENCY ISSUE
SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/700321569414144805/Is-Short-Term-Debt-a-Substitute-or-a-Complement-to-Good-Governance
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/32451

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/700321569414144805/Is-Short-Term-Debt-a-Substitute-or-a-Complement-to-Good-Governance
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/32451

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