Does Better Information Curb Customs Fraud?

Does Better Information Curb Customs Fraud?

This paper examines how providing better information to customs inspectors and monitoring their actions affects tax revenue and fraud detection in Madagascar. First, an instrumental variables strategy is used to show that transaction-specific, thir...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Chalendard, Cyril, Duhaut, Alice, Fernandes, Ana M., Mattoo, Aaditya, Raballand, Gael, Rijkers, Bob
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2020
Subjects:
TARIFF EVASION
TAX ENFORCEMENT
THIRD-PARTY INFORMATION
PERFORMANCE MONITORING
RISK MANAGEMENT
INFORMATION PROVISION
RANDOMIZED CONTROL TRIALS
CUSTOMS INSPECTION
TAX FRAUD
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/554091590075089654/Does-Better-Information-Curb-Customs-Fraud
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/33817

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/554091590075089654/Does-Better-Information-Curb-Customs-Fraud
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/33817

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