Does Better Information Curb Customs Fraud?
This paper examines how providing better information to customs inspectors and monitoring their actions affects tax revenue and fraud detection in Madagascar. First, an instrumental variables strategy is used to show that transaction-specific, thir...
Main Authors: | Chalendard, Cyril, Duhaut, Alice, Fernandes, Ana M., Mattoo, Aaditya, Raballand, Gael, Rijkers, Bob |
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Format: | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2020
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/554091590075089654/Does-Better-Information-Curb-Customs-Fraud http://hdl.handle.net/10986/33817 |
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