Scores, Camera, Action : Social Accountability and Teacher Incentives in Remote Areas
Remote schools in developing countries are costly to supervise, resulting in low teacher accountability and poor education outcomes. This paper reports the results of a randomized evaluation of three treatments that introduced teacher incentives ba...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2021
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/947161628601673722/Scores-Camera-Action-Social-Accountability-and-Teacher-Incentives-in-Remote-Areas http://hdl.handle.net/10986/36112 |
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okr-10986-361122021-08-13T05:10:33Z Scores, Camera, Action : Social Accountability and Teacher Incentives in Remote Areas Gaduh, Arya Pradhan, Menno Priebe, Jan Susanti, Dewi SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY COMMUNITY-BASED MONITORING TEACHER INCENTIVES TEACHER PERFORMANCE PERFORMANCE PAY REMOTE-AREA POLICY Remote schools in developing countries are costly to supervise, resulting in low teacher accountability and poor education outcomes. This paper reports the results of a randomized evaluation of three treatments that introduced teacher incentives based on community monitoring of teacher effort against locally agreed standards. The Social Accountability Mechanism (SAM) treatment facilitated a joint commitment between schools and community members to improve learning. Teacher performance was rated against it, discussed in monthly public meetings and passed on to authorities. The second and third treatments combined SAM with a performance pay mechanism that would penalize eligible teachers’ remote area allowance for poor performance. In the SAM+Camera (SAM+Cam) treatment, the cut was based on absence as recorded by a tamper-proof camera; while in the SAM+Score treatment, it was based on the overall rating. After one year, the findings indicate improvements in learning outcomes across all treatments; however, the strongest impact of 0.20 standard deviation is observed for SAM+Cam. The evaluation also finds a small positive impact on the effort of affected teachers for SAM+Cam and SAM, and significant positive improvements on parental educational investments in all treatments. For SAM and SAM+Cam, additional data were collected in the second year (one year after project facilitators left). The findings show that SAM+Cam’s impacts on learning outcomes and parental investments—but not teacher effort —persisted into the second year. 2021-08-12T13:28:59Z 2021-08-12T13:28:59Z 2021-08 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/947161628601673722/Scores-Camera-Action-Social-Accountability-and-Teacher-Incentives-in-Remote-Areas http://hdl.handle.net/10986/36112 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 9748 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY COMMUNITY-BASED MONITORING TEACHER INCENTIVES TEACHER PERFORMANCE PERFORMANCE PAY REMOTE-AREA POLICY |
| spellingShingle |
SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY COMMUNITY-BASED MONITORING TEACHER INCENTIVES TEACHER PERFORMANCE PERFORMANCE PAY REMOTE-AREA POLICY Gaduh, Arya Pradhan, Menno Priebe, Jan Susanti, Dewi Scores, Camera, Action : Social Accountability and Teacher Incentives in Remote Areas |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 9748 |
| description |
Remote schools in developing countries
are costly to supervise, resulting in low teacher
accountability and poor education outcomes. This paper
reports the results of a randomized evaluation of three
treatments that introduced teacher incentives based on
community monitoring of teacher effort against locally
agreed standards. The Social Accountability Mechanism (SAM)
treatment facilitated a joint commitment between schools and
community members to improve learning. Teacher performance
was rated against it, discussed in monthly public meetings
and passed on to authorities. The second and third
treatments combined SAM with a performance pay mechanism
that would penalize eligible teachers’ remote area allowance
for poor performance. In the SAM+Camera (SAM+Cam) treatment,
the cut was based on absence as recorded by a tamper-proof
camera; while in the SAM+Score treatment, it was based on
the overall rating. After one year, the findings indicate
improvements in learning outcomes across all treatments;
however, the strongest impact of 0.20 standard deviation is
observed for SAM+Cam. The evaluation also finds a small
positive impact on the effort of affected teachers for
SAM+Cam and SAM, and significant positive improvements on
parental educational investments in all treatments. For SAM
and SAM+Cam, additional data were collected in the second
year (one year after project facilitators left). The
findings show that SAM+Cam’s impacts on learning outcomes
and parental investments—but not teacher effort —persisted
into the second year. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
Gaduh, Arya Pradhan, Menno Priebe, Jan Susanti, Dewi |
| author_facet |
Gaduh, Arya Pradhan, Menno Priebe, Jan Susanti, Dewi |
| author_sort |
Gaduh, Arya |
| title |
Scores, Camera, Action : Social Accountability and Teacher Incentives in Remote Areas |
| title_short |
Scores, Camera, Action : Social Accountability and Teacher Incentives in Remote Areas |
| title_full |
Scores, Camera, Action : Social Accountability and Teacher Incentives in Remote Areas |
| title_fullStr |
Scores, Camera, Action : Social Accountability and Teacher Incentives in Remote Areas |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Scores, Camera, Action : Social Accountability and Teacher Incentives in Remote Areas |
| title_sort |
scores, camera, action : social accountability and teacher incentives in remote areas |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2021 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/947161628601673722/Scores-Camera-Action-Social-Accountability-and-Teacher-Incentives-in-Remote-Areas http://hdl.handle.net/10986/36112 |
| _version_ |
1764484452775362560 |