The Structure of Lobbying and Protection in U.S. Agriculture

The Structure of Lobbying and Protection in U.S. Agriculture

The author surveys the empirical literature on the political economy of agricultural protection. He uses a detailed data set of agricultural Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions over five U.S. congressional election cycles over the 1991-2000 period to investigate the relationship between l...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Gawande, Kishore
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT
AGRICULTURAL POLICY
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
AGRICULTURE
ARISTOCRACY
BROOKS
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
COLLECTIVE ACTION
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
CONSTITUENCY
CONSTITUENTS
CONSUMER SURPLUS
CONSUMERS
DECISION MAKERS
DEMAND CURVE
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
ECONOMETRIC MODELS
ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM
ECONOMICS LITERATURE
ELASTICITY
EQUIPMENT
EUROPEAN UNION
FARMERS
FARMS
FORESTRY
FREE RIDER
FREE RIDER PROBLEM
FREE TRADE
FRUITS
GDP
INCOMES
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES
INTEREST GROUPS
LAND OWNERSHIP
LOBBYING
MAJORITIES
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
PAC
POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
POLITICAL SUPPORT
POLITICIANS
PRESSURE GROUPS
PROGRAMS
SOFT MONEY
SUPPLY CURVE
SUPPLY CURVES
TOTAL OUTPUT
TRADE BARRIERS
TRADE LIBERALIZATION
URUGUAY ROUND
UTILITY FUNCTIONS
VALUE ADDED
VOTING
WAGE RATES
WAGES
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/09/6294485/structure-lobbying-protection-agriculture
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8262

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/09/6294485/structure-lobbying-protection-agriculture
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8262

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