The Structure of Lobbying and Protection in U.S. Agriculture

The author surveys the empirical literature on the political economy of agricultural protection. He uses a detailed data set of agricultural Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions over five U.S. congressional election cycles over the 1991-2000 period to investigate the relationship between l...

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Main Author:	Gawande, Kishore
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT AGRICULTURAL POLICY AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AGRICULTURE ARISTOCRACY BROOKS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS COLLECTIVE ACTION COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DECISION MAKERS DEMAND CURVE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM ECONOMICS LITERATURE ELASTICITY EQUIPMENT EUROPEAN UNION FARMERS FARMS FORESTRY FREE RIDER FREE RIDER PROBLEM FREE TRADE FRUITS GDP INCOMES INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES INTEREST GROUPS LAND OWNERSHIP LOBBYING MAJORITIES NASH EQUILIBRIUM PAC POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT POLITICAL SUPPORT POLITICIANS PRESSURE GROUPS PROGRAMS SOFT MONEY SUPPLY CURVE SUPPLY CURVES TOTAL OUTPUT TRADE BARRIERS TRADE LIBERALIZATION URUGUAY ROUND UTILITY FUNCTIONS VALUE ADDED VOTING WAGE RATES WAGES
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/09/6294485/structure-lobbying-protection-agriculture http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8262

id	okr-10986-8262
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-82622021-04-23T14:02:43Z The Structure of Lobbying and Protection in U.S. Agriculture Gawande, Kishore AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT AGRICULTURAL POLICY AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AGRICULTURE ARISTOCRACY BROOKS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS COLLECTIVE ACTION COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DECISION MAKERS DEMAND CURVE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM ECONOMICS LITERATURE ELASTICITY EQUIPMENT EUROPEAN UNION FARMERS FARMS FORESTRY FREE RIDER FREE RIDER PROBLEM FREE TRADE FRUITS GDP INCOMES INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES INTEREST GROUPS LAND OWNERSHIP LOBBYING MAJORITIES NASH EQUILIBRIUM PAC POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT POLITICAL SUPPORT POLITICIANS PRESSURE GROUPS PROGRAMS SOFT MONEY SUPPLY CURVE SUPPLY CURVES TOTAL OUTPUT TRADE BARRIERS TRADE LIBERALIZATION URUGUAY ROUND UTILITY FUNCTIONS VALUE ADDED VOTING WAGE RATES WAGES The author surveys the empirical literature on the political economy of agricultural protection. He uses a detailed data set of agricultural Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions over five U.S. congressional election cycles over the 1991-2000 period to investigate the relationship between lobbying spending and agricultural protection. A detailed graphical analysis of campaign contributions by the agricultural PACs indicates that although there are very many PACs, in most sectors the majority of contributions are made by very few PACs. Econometric analysis reveals that lobbying spending by agricultural PACs is positively associated with the use of nontariff barriers and specific tariffs by the United States. There is a strong association between the average U.S. tariff on goods that benefit from U.S. export subsidies and lobbying spending. And there is no association between agricultural protection and trade measures such as import penetration and the export-to-output ratio. 2012-06-18T15:32:15Z 2012-06-18T15:32:15Z 2005-09 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/09/6294485/structure-lobbying-protection-agriculture http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8262 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3722 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research United States
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT AGRICULTURAL POLICY AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AGRICULTURE ARISTOCRACY BROOKS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS COLLECTIVE ACTION COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DECISION MAKERS DEMAND CURVE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM ECONOMICS LITERATURE ELASTICITY EQUIPMENT EUROPEAN UNION FARMERS FARMS FORESTRY FREE RIDER FREE RIDER PROBLEM FREE TRADE FRUITS GDP INCOMES INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES INTEREST GROUPS LAND OWNERSHIP LOBBYING MAJORITIES NASH EQUILIBRIUM PAC POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT POLITICAL SUPPORT POLITICIANS PRESSURE GROUPS PROGRAMS SOFT MONEY SUPPLY CURVE SUPPLY CURVES TOTAL OUTPUT TRADE BARRIERS TRADE LIBERALIZATION URUGUAY ROUND UTILITY FUNCTIONS VALUE ADDED VOTING WAGE RATES WAGES
spellingShingle	AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT AGRICULTURAL POLICY AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AGRICULTURE ARISTOCRACY BROOKS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS COLLECTIVE ACTION COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DECISION MAKERS DEMAND CURVE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM ECONOMICS LITERATURE ELASTICITY EQUIPMENT EUROPEAN UNION FARMERS FARMS FORESTRY FREE RIDER FREE RIDER PROBLEM FREE TRADE FRUITS GDP INCOMES INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES INTEREST GROUPS LAND OWNERSHIP LOBBYING MAJORITIES NASH EQUILIBRIUM PAC POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT POLITICAL SUPPORT POLITICIANS PRESSURE GROUPS PROGRAMS SOFT MONEY SUPPLY CURVE SUPPLY CURVES TOTAL OUTPUT TRADE BARRIERS TRADE LIBERALIZATION URUGUAY ROUND UTILITY FUNCTIONS VALUE ADDED VOTING WAGE RATES WAGES Gawande, Kishore The Structure of Lobbying and Protection in U.S. Agriculture
geographic_facet	United States
relation	Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3722
description	The author surveys the empirical literature on the political economy of agricultural protection. He uses a detailed data set of agricultural Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions over five U.S. congressional election cycles over the 1991-2000 period to investigate the relationship between lobbying spending and agricultural protection. A detailed graphical analysis of campaign contributions by the agricultural PACs indicates that although there are very many PACs, in most sectors the majority of contributions are made by very few PACs. Econometric analysis reveals that lobbying spending by agricultural PACs is positively associated with the use of nontariff barriers and specific tariffs by the United States. There is a strong association between the average U.S. tariff on goods that benefit from U.S. export subsidies and lobbying spending. And there is no association between agricultural protection and trade measures such as import penetration and the export-to-output ratio.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Gawande, Kishore
author_facet	Gawande, Kishore
author_sort	Gawande, Kishore
title	The Structure of Lobbying and Protection in U.S. Agriculture
title_short	The Structure of Lobbying and Protection in U.S. Agriculture
title_full	The Structure of Lobbying and Protection in U.S. Agriculture
title_fullStr	The Structure of Lobbying and Protection in U.S. Agriculture
title_full_unstemmed	The Structure of Lobbying and Protection in U.S. Agriculture
title_sort	structure of lobbying and protection in u.s. agriculture
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/09/6294485/structure-lobbying-protection-agriculture http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8262
_version_	1764407815978352640

The Structure of Lobbying and Protection in U.S. Agriculture

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