The Economics of Consanguineous Marriages

The institution of consanguineous marriage-a marriage contracted between close biological relatives-has been a basic building block of many societies in different parts of the world. This paper argues that the practice of consanguinity is closely related to the practice of dowry, and that both arise...

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Main Authors:	Do, Quy-Toan, Iyer, Sriya, Joshi, Shareen
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	AGE AT MARRIAGE AGED COMMUNITIES COMPENSATION CONGENITAL MALFORMATIONS DEPENDENCE DESCENT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DIET DISEASES DOMESTIC ABUSE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DOWRIES DOWRY ECONOMIC STATUS ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS EXTENDED FAMILY FAMILIES FAMILY HEALTH FATHERS FOLKLORE GENERATIONS HOUSEHOLDS HUMAN POPULATIONS HUSBANDS IDEAS IMMIGRANT INFORMATION FOR WOMEN INSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS KINSHIP LABOR MARKETS LAWS LEVELS OF MORTALITY MARRIAGES MARRIED MEN MARRIED WOMEN MIDDLE EAST MORTALITY MOTHER NORTH AFRICA PARENTS POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POOR FAMILIES POORER PEOPLE POWER PROGRESS PUBLIC HEALTH REGIONAL DIFFERENCES RELIGION RELIGIOUS GROUPS RESPECT RURAL AREAS SOCIAL NETWORKS SOCIAL RELATIONS SOCIAL SCIENCE SOCIAL STATUS SOCIETIES SOCIETY SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS SPOUSE SPOUSES TRANSPORTATION UNIONS URBAN AREAS VILLAGES WESTERN EUROPE
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/12/7249154/economics-consanguineous-marriages http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8845

id	okr-10986-8845
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-88452021-04-23T14:02:41Z The Economics of Consanguineous Marriages Do, Quy-Toan Iyer, Sriya Joshi, Shareen AGE AT MARRIAGE AGED COMMUNITIES COMPENSATION CONGENITAL MALFORMATIONS DEPENDENCE DESCENT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DIET DISEASES DOMESTIC ABUSE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DOWRIES DOWRY ECONOMIC STATUS ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS EXTENDED FAMILY FAMILIES FAMILY HEALTH FATHERS FOLKLORE GENERATIONS HOUSEHOLDS HUMAN POPULATIONS HUSBANDS IDEAS IMMIGRANT INFORMATION FOR WOMEN INSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS KINSHIP LABOR MARKETS LAWS LEVELS OF MORTALITY MARRIAGES MARRIED MEN MARRIED WOMEN MIDDLE EAST MORTALITY MOTHER NORTH AFRICA PARENTS POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POOR FAMILIES POORER PEOPLE POWER PROGRESS PUBLIC HEALTH REGIONAL DIFFERENCES RELIGION RELIGIOUS GROUPS RESPECT RURAL AREAS SOCIAL NETWORKS SOCIAL RELATIONS SOCIAL SCIENCE SOCIAL STATUS SOCIETIES SOCIETY SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS SPOUSE SPOUSES TRANSPORTATION UNIONS URBAN AREAS VILLAGES WESTERN EUROPE The institution of consanguineous marriage-a marriage contracted between close biological relatives-has been a basic building block of many societies in different parts of the world. This paper argues that the practice of consanguinity is closely related to the practice of dowry, and that both arise in response to an agency problem between the families of a bride and a groom. When marriage contracts are incomplete, dowries transfer control rights to the party with the highest incentives to invest in a marriage. When these transactions are costly however, consanguinity can be a more appropriate response since it directly reduces the agency cost. The paper's model predicts that dowry transfers are less likely to be observed in consanguineous unions. It also emphasizes the effect of credit constraints on the relative prevalence of dowry payment and consanguinity. An empirical analysis using data from Bangladesh delivers robust results consistent with the predictions of the model. 2012-06-22T19:54:06Z 2012-06-22T19:54:06Z 2006-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/12/7249154/economics-consanguineous-marriages http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8845 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 4085 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research South Asia Bangladesh
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	AGE AT MARRIAGE AGED COMMUNITIES COMPENSATION CONGENITAL MALFORMATIONS DEPENDENCE DESCENT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DIET DISEASES DOMESTIC ABUSE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DOWRIES DOWRY ECONOMIC STATUS ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS EXTENDED FAMILY FAMILIES FAMILY HEALTH FATHERS FOLKLORE GENERATIONS HOUSEHOLDS HUMAN POPULATIONS HUSBANDS IDEAS IMMIGRANT INFORMATION FOR WOMEN INSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS KINSHIP LABOR MARKETS LAWS LEVELS OF MORTALITY MARRIAGES MARRIED MEN MARRIED WOMEN MIDDLE EAST MORTALITY MOTHER NORTH AFRICA PARENTS POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POOR FAMILIES POORER PEOPLE POWER PROGRESS PUBLIC HEALTH REGIONAL DIFFERENCES RELIGION RELIGIOUS GROUPS RESPECT RURAL AREAS SOCIAL NETWORKS SOCIAL RELATIONS SOCIAL SCIENCE SOCIAL STATUS SOCIETIES SOCIETY SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS SPOUSE SPOUSES TRANSPORTATION UNIONS URBAN AREAS VILLAGES WESTERN EUROPE
spellingShingle	AGE AT MARRIAGE AGED COMMUNITIES COMPENSATION CONGENITAL MALFORMATIONS DEPENDENCE DESCENT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DIET DISEASES DOMESTIC ABUSE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DOWRIES DOWRY ECONOMIC STATUS ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS EXTENDED FAMILY FAMILIES FAMILY HEALTH FATHERS FOLKLORE GENERATIONS HOUSEHOLDS HUMAN POPULATIONS HUSBANDS IDEAS IMMIGRANT INFORMATION FOR WOMEN INSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS KINSHIP LABOR MARKETS LAWS LEVELS OF MORTALITY MARRIAGES MARRIED MEN MARRIED WOMEN MIDDLE EAST MORTALITY MOTHER NORTH AFRICA PARENTS POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POOR FAMILIES POORER PEOPLE POWER PROGRESS PUBLIC HEALTH REGIONAL DIFFERENCES RELIGION RELIGIOUS GROUPS RESPECT RURAL AREAS SOCIAL NETWORKS SOCIAL RELATIONS SOCIAL SCIENCE SOCIAL STATUS SOCIETIES SOCIETY SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS SPOUSE SPOUSES TRANSPORTATION UNIONS URBAN AREAS VILLAGES WESTERN EUROPE Do, Quy-Toan Iyer, Sriya Joshi, Shareen The Economics of Consanguineous Marriages
geographic_facet	South Asia Bangladesh
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 4085
description	The institution of consanguineous marriage-a marriage contracted between close biological relatives-has been a basic building block of many societies in different parts of the world. This paper argues that the practice of consanguinity is closely related to the practice of dowry, and that both arise in response to an agency problem between the families of a bride and a groom. When marriage contracts are incomplete, dowries transfer control rights to the party with the highest incentives to invest in a marriage. When these transactions are costly however, consanguinity can be a more appropriate response since it directly reduces the agency cost. The paper's model predicts that dowry transfers are less likely to be observed in consanguineous unions. It also emphasizes the effect of credit constraints on the relative prevalence of dowry payment and consanguinity. An empirical analysis using data from Bangladesh delivers robust results consistent with the predictions of the model.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Do, Quy-Toan Iyer, Sriya Joshi, Shareen
author_facet	Do, Quy-Toan Iyer, Sriya Joshi, Shareen
author_sort	Do, Quy-Toan
title	The Economics of Consanguineous Marriages
title_short	The Economics of Consanguineous Marriages
title_full	The Economics of Consanguineous Marriages
title_fullStr	The Economics of Consanguineous Marriages
title_full_unstemmed	The Economics of Consanguineous Marriages
title_sort	economics of consanguineous marriages
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/12/7249154/economics-consanguineous-marriages http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8845
_version_	1764406638174797824

The Economics of Consanguineous Marriages

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